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Abstract—Data collection in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN)
draws significant attention, due to emerging interest in tech-
nologies ranging from Internet of Things (IoT) networks to
simple “Presence” applications, which identify the status of the
devices (active or inactive). Numerous Medium Access Control
(MAC) protocols for WSN, which can address the challenge
of data collection in dense networks, were suggested over the
years. Most of these protocols utilize the traditional layering
approach, in which the MAC layer is unaware of the encapsulated
packet payload, and therefore there is no connection between the
data collected, the physical layer and the signaling mechanisms.
Nonetheless, in many of the applications that intend to utilize such
protocols, nodes may need to exchange very little information,
and do so only sporadically, that is, while the number of devices
in the network can be very large, only a subset wishes to transmit
at any given time. Thus, a tailored protocol, which matches the
signaling, physical layer and access control to traffic patterns is
required.
In this work, we design and analyze a data collection protocol
based on information theoretic principles. In the suggested
protocol, the sink collects messages from up to K sensors simul-
taneously, out of a large population of sensors, without knowing
in advance which sensors will transmit, and without requiring
any synchronization, coordination or management overhead. In
other words, neither the sink nor the other sensors need to
know who are the actively transmitting sensors, and this data is
decoded directly from the channel output. We provide a simple
codebook construction with very simple encoding and decoding
procedures. We further design a secure version of the protocol,
in which an eavesdropper observing only partial information
sent on the channel cannot gain significant information on the
messages transmitted or even which are the sources that sent
these messages.
I. INTRODUCTION
Utilizing scattered Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) for
gathering environmental information from a large number of
sensor nodes with limited capabilities continues to draw a lot
of attention from both industrial and academic communities,
due to the large number of applications that rely on such
infrastructures. For example, WSN will be a crucial technol-
ogy enabler for implementation in the emerging Internet of
Things (IoT) environment [1], which will allow collection of
information from densely deployed sensors, many of which
are cheap with very limited capabilities (e.g., memory or
energy resources) and compete for limited wireless resources
(e.g., time or spectrum). In many of these applications, the
majority of the sensors need to report only a limited amount of
information, and do so only infrequently. For example, many
of these sensors need to periodically send a keep alive message
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to inform the sink node that their battery has not drained out,
and occasionally report one of several possible events, e.g.,
motion detected, temperature is above a given threshold, or
one out of several quantized values. Accordingly, the main
challenge for such networks is to cope with a huge number
of simple devices that need to send limited information,
competing for very limited wireless resources (compared to
the number of sensors) while saving energy.
Numerous Medium Access Control (MAC) protocols for
WSN have been suggested over the years, designed to cope
with various setups and objectives (a short representative
overview is provided in Section III). In particular, traffic
in a WSN can be quite dynamic, depending on the events
being sensed, the sensing application and the protocols being
used. Therefore, such protocols should perform well under a
wide range of traffic loads, a variety of network topologies
and various objectives such as latency, reliability, energy
consumption, security, etc. Accordingly, many of these MAC
protocols were designed and examined to be robust under
diverse setups. The approach of designing a MAC protocol
regardless of the wireless Phy-protocol being used, the routing
protocol employed, and even the application expected to utilize
it, is consistent with the network-layering conceptual model.
However, even though these protocols perform well under a
large variety of setups, this universality comes at a price. For
example, a MAC protocol allowing any subset of the sensors,
regardless of its size, to transmit simultaneously will suffer
from many collisions and high overhead if indeed a large
subset attempts transmission concurrently. Another example is
a keep alive frame transmitted over WiFi, that conveys only the
sender ID and a single bit of relevant information (the sensor
is alive), yet requires a large number of bits to be transferred
due to headers, physical encapsulation, etc.
In this paper, we design, analyze and evaluate a highly
efficient WSN MAC protocol specially designed to collect
information from a large number of sensors, utilizing infor-
mation theoretic concepts and novel signaling and decoding
techniques which allow us to jointly optimize all layers
together. We assume the sensors are very simple, with highly
constrained capabilities, e.g., no power control, rate adaptation
mechanisms or sophisticated algorithmic capabilities. Thus,
the key idea that our protocol relies on, is that instead of
the typical frame mechanism using data encapsulation, each
sensor is assigned a unique transmission pattern for each of
its messages, which conveys both the information and the
sensor’s ID. Whenever a sensor wishes to transmit a report,
it waits to receive a predefined periodic preamble sent by its
designated sink, and then transmits a sequence of impulses
according to the transmission pattern which corresponds to
the report it wishes to send. The sink node can receive and
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2Figure 1: A schematic illustration of an IoT network. Data is
collected by a sink, when K sensors, out of a large population
of N sensors in the network have a message to transmit over
the wireless channel.
decode several simultaneous transmissions in a way that it
can recognize both the sender and the information sent from
the collected channel output received. Namely, a collision
resolution procedure or scheduling ([2]) are not required to
decode the K simultaneously transmission. This is done using
a carefully designed codebook, and a matching decoding
algorithm that identifies both the sensors which transmitted as
well as their codewords. Interestingly, unlike Code-Division
Multiple-Access Channels (CDMA), the sink node can rely
on a simple energy detection in order to decode, and not on
the exact received power or any power adaptation mechanism,
thus dramatically improving robustness.
To provide some insight into the suggested approach and
illustrate its basic concept, consider the toy example depicted
in Figure 1. In this example, we assume four sensors transmit-
ting to a sink. The four sensors have 3, 2, 2 and 4 messages
each. Each one of the messages is assigned a unique pattern,
comprised of high and low level elements which are known to
the sensor itself and to the sink. For example, Sensor 1’s first
message is encoded starting with a low level symbol followed
by a high level symbol, a sequence of 4 low level symbols,
etc. After receiving a predefined beacon from the sink, which
initiates a conceptual set of mini-timeslots, each sensor ready
to transmit emits energy (transmits) according to the pattern
assigned to the message to be transmitted. Specifically, it emits
energy in the minislots which correspond to a high level in
the message pattern and stays idle in the other minislots. In
the above example only two sensors are awake and ready to
transmit (sensors 2 and 4). Sensor 2 emits energy in minislots
2, 8 and 11 according to the pattern assigned to its second
message, and Sensor 4 emits energy in minislots 1, 6 and
11 according to the pattern assigned to its third message.
The received signal at the sink is a combination of the two
transmitted sequences (energy at minislots 1, 2, 6, 8 and 11,
with some additional noise). The sink performs an energy
detection procedure on the received signal according to a
predefined threshold, identifying which minislots were busy
and which were idle (below the energy threshold). Note that
due to the energy aggregate, the receiver gain can be saturated
(e.g., several sensors emitted energy into the same minislot)
yet all the sink needs to identify is on which minislots the
energy is above the noise level (above the threshold). In other
words, each minislot should be at a length sufficient to decode
one bit and the sink cares only about the Boolean sum of
the “bit” patterns used by the transmitting sensors. Based on
the filtered sequence (the energy detection sequence in the
figure) the sink deduces which set of transmitted sequences
could have generated the sequence received. In this example,
there is no single sequence that can result in the received
sequence; the only two sequences that can be combined into
the received signal are the sequences corresponding to the
second message of Sensor 2 and the third message of Sensor
4. Any other combination of sequences would result in a
mismatch between the expected and the actual minislot energy
levels. Note that even though in this toy example a simple
Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA), which assigns each
message a unique minislot can also work, in reality, where
the overall number of sensors is high, such a solution requires
many minislots (linear in the number of sensors) regardless
of the actual number of sensors transmitting in each round.
Assuming the number of sensors expected to transmit is
moderate, the solution we suggest in the sequel requires only a
logarithmic number of minislots, improving air time utilization
and reducing the burden of contention for channel access and
collision resolution procedures.
Another major challenge that our protocol can be easily
modified to address is privacy and secrecy. In many such
networks the information sent by the sensors is meant to
be secure or private, i.e., we require that an eavesdropper
(Eve) or an unintended addressee will not be able to decode
the information, and sometimes not even identify the sender.
Note that in the setup described above, since the sensors
have limited information, identifying even the identity of the
sending sensor may convey a lot of information, hence, in
such cases, encryption is not very efficient. In this paper, we
propose an enhancement to the suggested protocol, such that
an eavesdropper receiving only parts of the channel output, is
kept ignorant both of the content of the message and of the
identity of the senders, at the expense of a small enlargement
of the patterns allocated for each message, depending on the
level of secrecy required.
In particular, the contributions of this work are as follows:
• We present a new MAC protocol, for data collection from
dense wireless sensor networks, in which the sensors
are expected to transmit only sporadically, and only a
predefined amount of information (one out of a bank of
possible messages per sensor). In the suggested protocol,
the sink can collect up to K reports simultaneously
without any management or scheduling.
• We present a downlink version of the protocol as well,
suitable for data dissemination from a sink to a set
of K out of N sensors simultaneously, without any
management overhead, a predefined schedule or even a
message notifying the relevant set of sensors.
• To support the protocols, we provide a codebook con-
struction with a very simple encoding and decoding
procedure, such that not only the code is efficient but also
3the transmitted codewords are self-contained and do not
require headers, trailers or sender identity. Moreover, we
suggest effective decoding algorithms based on Column
Matching [3].
• We extend the single hop setup considered throughout
the paper a to multi-hop setup in which a message needs
to traverse multiple hops (pass through multiple relays)
before reaching its designated sink.
• We present a secure version of the suggested uplink
protocol, in which an eavesdropper receiving only part of
the channel output cannot decode the messages or even
identify the senders. Effective decoding algorithms are
given as well.
• We consider advance techniques for wireless transmis-
sion, in which the devices in the protocol suggested use
OFDMA with BPSK modulator.
• We present a rigorous analysis, proving the reliability of
the protocols as well as establishing sufficiency bounds
on the parameters, for both the unsecured and secured
versions. Specifically, given the total number of sensors,
the maximal number of different messages each sensor
can have and the maximal number of simultaneous trans-
missions that the sink can decode, we provide bounds on
the size of the codewords. We present numerical results
which confirm our analytical results.
The structure of this work is as follows. In Section II, the
system model is described. In Section III, we summarize
the related work. In Sections IV and V the protocol is
described. Section VI includes the code construction and the
decoding procedure. In Section VII, an efficient decoding
algorithm is described. In Section VIII, we analyze the effects
of a noisy channel and possible solutions. In Section IX,
the multi-hop setup considered. In Section X, an analogous
data dissemination protocol is described. In Section XI, we
consider an OFDMA extention. Section XII gives simulation
results of the WSN and SWSN protocols, while Section XIII
describes an implementation of the protocol on of-the-shelve,
simple sensors. Section XIV concludes the paper. Appendix
A includes the code construction and the decoding procedures
of the SWSN model.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We assume a dense wireless sensor network that harvests
data from the area covered by the network. The network
consists of multiple sinks (cluster heads) each collecting
reports from a large set of sensors independently. Throughout
the paper, we will focus on a single such cluster consisting
of a large set of wireless sensors, denoted by N , and a
single sink. We denote by N = |N | the total number of
sensors in the network (cluster). We assume that all sensors
are connected to the sink node, but only in the following
limited sense. First, beacons by the sink should be heard by
all sensors. Then, in our upstream model (from the sensors
to the sink) it is sufficient for the sink to be able to detect
only whether there were transmissions (one or more) on the
channel. For example, whether the received SNR is above
a threshold. The sink does not necessarily need to decode
any information from a single transmission from a single
sensor, and the received SNR is not necessarily above a
decodable threshold. Specifically, we assume that in order
to identify transmissions on the channel, the sink simply
employs an energy detection mechanism (similar to traditional
”carrier sense”) in which it can recognize whether there is
a transmission on the channel or not, yet it cannot identify
the exact number of such simultaneous transmissions, and
certainly cannot directly decode information from them.
We assume that each sensor i has Ci different messages
it can transmit. There are no restrictions on the message
length each sensor holds in its message bank. There are
also no constraints on the message content each sensor has.
For simplicity we will assume throughout the paper that
Ci = C,∀i. Nonetheless, an extension to different Ci’s is
straightforward. We further assume that each sensor needs to
transmit a message sporadically. In particular, we will assume
that the sensors employ a duty cycle mechanism in which
they randomly wake up and transmit a message unless they
have an urgent message they need to transmit, in which case
they wake up instantly waiting for transmission opportunity.
We assume that the wakeup times including the urgent report
instances are arranged such that the probability that more than
K sensors are awake at the same time waiting for transmission
opportunity is very low. Note that we have no restriction on K
(i.e., K ≤ N ), however, we emphasize that the smaller K is
compared to N , the more efficient is the protocol we suggest.
In the second part of the paper, we address a secure version,
in which we assume that an eavesdropper is present, and
observes a noisy version of what is received by the sink node.
In particular, we assume that the eavesdropper has the exact
same abilities as the sink including knowledge of all necessary
codes, yet it can observe the channel only a δ fraction of the
time; specifically the eavesdropper listens to (observes) the
activity on the channel with probability δ and does not listen
with probability 1−δ, e.g., if the time is slotted, the probability
that the eavesdropper will observe or not observe the activity
on the channel per slot is δ and 1− δ, respectively. Note that
this model is similar to the common erasure channel (or packet
erasure channel) but the erasures are on the channel activity
and not on a bit (or a packet).
III. RELATED WORKS
We divide the discussion on related works into two parts. In
the first, we provide a brief overview of several multipurpose
WSN MAC protocols. Then, since our protocol is inspired by
the classical Group Testing (GT) approach, in the second part
we give a brief overview of related GT results.
WSN MAC protocols: Since on the one hand, one of the
foremost objectives of WSN is energy conservation, and on
the other sensor nodes are expected to report only sporadically
(and many of the reports can tolerate a short delay), most of
the MAC protocols which were designed for WSN over the
past decade and a half rely on a duty cycling technique in
which each sensor node turns its radio on only periodically,
alternating between active and sleeping modes [4]–[6]. Such
protocols took different approaches to address the rendezvous
challenge in which a sender and a receiver should be awake
at the same time in order to exchange information. In the
4synchronous approach, nodes’ active and sleeping periods
are aligned, i.e., all sensor nodes are active at the same
time intervals and are required to contend for transmission
opportunities during these intervals, e.g., [7]–[9]. The asyn-
chronous approach allows sensor nodes to choose individual
wakeup times, maintaining unsynchronized duty-cycles, and
employing various strategies to detect transmissions in the
network and enable rendezvous between senders and receivers,
e.g., [10]–[12]. However, all these protocols are designed to
support various types of traffic patterns, diverse topologies
(e.g., single and multi-hop topologies) and most importantly, to
support any kind of information exchange between the sensors.
Accordingly, they have adopted the traditional approach in
which the proposed channel access mechanism is independent
from the message payload exchange between the sensor nodes,
at the price of data encapsulation and signaling overhead. In
this work, since the information each sensor needs to convey is
limited to one out of a number of known messages, we take a
cross-layer design in which the coding and the channel access
algorithm are intertwined. Indeed recently, data aggregation
was used to compress the data and reduce its redundancy in
order to save network energy before transmission to the sink
[13]–[15]. In a sense, in the protocol we give herein, using the
coding we suggest, the channel inherently compresses the data
efficiently (based on a modified GT approach) by the addition
in the air of the K messages transmitted simultaneously from
the sensors to the sink.
Group Testing: Classical group testing was used during
World War II in order to identify syphilis infected draftees
while dramatically reducing the number of required tests, by
examining pooled tests of mixed blood samples [16].
The concept was adopted later for multi access protocols.
Specifically, MAC protocols adopted the GT philosophy for
Collision Resolution Protocols (CRP). The basic idea behind
these protocols is to resolve collisions whenever multiple
users are trying to access the channel simultaneously, e.g.,
the binary-tree CR, the epoch mechanism or the Clipped
Binary-Tree Protocol. An extensive survey of such protocols
is given in [2, Chapter 5]. However, all these protocols utilized
the GT concept only as a collision resolution mechanism,
i.e., in case a collision occurred, they used the concept in
order to decide who should contend for the channel next and
when. Data was decoded successfully only when a single node
transmitted without collision, using the standard layering and
encapsulation. Thus, it is important to note that while there
are indeed many works in the literature which utilize GT
concepts in communication networks and other models [17]–
[24], none suggest a protocol for collecting or disseminating
data in wireless sensor networks. The main contribution of
this paper is in suggesting a protocol which decodes all data,
from all simultaneously transmitting sensors, using a novel
extension to this concept, namely, analysing the location of
the colliding and non-colliding minislots in order to identify
both the senders and the data sent.
IV. WSN DATA COLLECTING PROTOCOL DESIGN
In the suggested protocol, the sink periodically transmits a
predefined beacon, which starts a report transmission interval.
Figure 2: Basic protocol operation.
We term this beacon RFR (Request For Reports). The RFR is
then followed by a sequence of T minislots. Figure 2 provides
an illustration of the protocol operation. Note that there is no
need for synchronization or for each sensor to keep track of the
minislot boundaries at all times, as the awake sensors waiting
for transmission can synchronize based on the received RFR.
Denote by τ the maximum propagation delay between any
sensor and the sink, and by η the time required by the sink to
identify that there is transmission going on. Note that η can
be very short, as it only corresponds to the duration required
by the sink to sample the channel and identify that there is
a transmission going on (there are no headers, preambles or
data involved). We assume that the minislot duration is longer
than 2τ + η, which is sufficient for all sensors to receive the
RFR, start a transmission of duration η and for the sink to
receive all the transmissions starting in this minislot. I.e., as
far as the sink is concerned, the time duration of a minislot is
such that there is no transmission that can start on the current
slot and leak to the next slot. It is reasonable to assume that
η ≥ τ , hence the minislot duration is greater than 3τ . After
transmitting the RFR, the sink node switches to receive mode
and identifies whether there was a transmission on each of the
following T minislots. Recall that the sink detection is binary,
i.e., it can only recognize whether there was a transmission in
a minislot or not. It does not try to detect how many sensors
transmitted during an occupied minislot.
Each sensor is assigned a unique sequence of ones and
zeroes of length T , for each of its messages. The construction
of the sequences is given in Section VI. A sensor wishing to
send a report wakes up and waits for the RFR. After receiving
the RFR, the sensor follows the sequence associated with
the message it wishes to transmit, transmitting ”energy” of
duration η (in the form of a pre-defined signal) at each minislot
in which the corresponding bit in the sequence is one.
After the T minislots interval, the sink has a sequence of
ones and zeroes of length T , indicating on which of the minis-
lots it identified transmission. We denote by Y (t) the sequence
observed by the sink at the t-th interval. Based on the observed
Y (t) the sink tries to decode the messages transmitted by the
sensors (we provide two decoding algorithms in Sections VI
and VII). Note that since the sequences are unique, each
sequence indicates the identity of the sender and the message
sent. If the sink is not able to decode the received sequence
Y (t), which, as we prove in Section VI, can only happen if
5the number of transmitting sensors in the interval was greater
than the expected number K for which the sequences were
designed, it transmits another beacon, termed Retransmission
Request (RR), which starts the exact same procedure as the
RFR only this time sensors waiting for transmission participate
in the following interval only with some probability. The
probability for participating in the following interval is pre-
defined and can prioritize different messages (e.g., messages
with high urgency will receive high probability and messages
that can tolerate delay will be assigned low probabilities and
sensors with non-urgent messages can go back to sleep waiting
for their next wakeup time). The discussion on the collision
resolution probabilities is beyond the scope of this paper, as
our novelty lies in the transmission protocol and its ability to
allow multiple transmission of messages without the various
MAC and upper layers overheads. The collision resolution
procedure is rather standard and can be repeated multiple
times.
It is important to note that the suggested protocol can be
interleaved within traditional wireless sensor protocols, in
which some or all sensors are required to send occasionally
a regular report. For example, the suggested protocol can be
incorporated within the operation of RI-MAC [11], such that
occasionally the sink transmits an ordinary RI-MAC beacon,
which is different from the RFR beacon, to initiate an RI-MAC
operation interval, i.e., the RI-MAC beacon will be followed
by ordinary DATA transmissions according to the ordinary RI-
MAC protocol. In the same manner, the suggested protocol
can be combined with transmitter initiating protocol such as
X-MAC [10], such that a sensor wishing to report a typical
DATA packet transmits a sequence of short preambles prior to
DATA transmission according to the X-MAC protocol.
Moreover, in Section IX, we extend the single hop setup
presented in this section, to support a multi-hop setup in which
a message needs to traverse multiple hops before reaching its
designated sink.
Power Consumption: energy efficiency is an important per-
formance criterion in wireless sensor networks. The protocol
suggested in this paper is a MAC protocol in which the
receiver initiates the data transmission. It has been shown
that such protocols are highly energy-efficient over a wide
range of traffic loads and topologies (e.g., [11], [12], [25]).
However, such protocols are prone to collisions when the
network is dense and multiple devices are waiting to transmit
simultaneously to the same receiver (sink, or a relay in a
multihop topology). Such collisions are energy wasteful as
they not only waste the energy consumed by the devices in the
failed transmission but they also require a collision resolution
mechanism to allow retransmission of the lost packets, a
mechanism which is typically consume high energy. The pro-
tocol introduced in this paper improves energy consumption
over the existing receiver initiated MAC protocol by four
means. First and foremost, it allows the transmission of up
to K devices simultaneously, hence dramatically reduces the
collision probability. Note that K is a parameter chosen by
design hence can be adjusted based on the topology and the
expected traffic pattern. Second, the overhead involved in a
packet transmission (the protocol data unit (PDU)) is dra-
matically reduced, hence transmission time is reduced. Third,
the protocol relies on an energy detection mechanism which
is robust to noise and interference hence suffers minimum
transmission failures. Furthermore, simple energy detection
requires a relatively low SNR to operate robustly. Fourth, the
hardware requires only a simple energy detection mechanism
with no need to run sophisticated algorithms, hence is expected
to be very energy efficient.
V. MODEL FORMULATION AND TRANSMISSION PROCESS
In this section, we formalize the WSN model that is used
throughout the paper. We denote the set of wireless sensors by
N . We will concentrate on a time instance right after an RFR
has been sent by the sink and a subset of unknown sensors
comply with the RFR, and transmit their reports. We denote
this unknown subsets by K. We denote by N = |N | and
K = |K| the total number of sensors, and the number of active
sensors at the same time slot, respectively. In the analytical
part of the paper we will assume that the number K of active
sensors is known a-priori. The algorithms and results presented
hereby can be easily adopted to the case where only an upper
bound on K is known, and the actual number is smaller. The
case where more than K transmit was briefly described at the
end of Section IV. The sink objective is to determine which
subset of the sensors were active and what is the information
(messages) they transmitted. Throughout the paper, logarithms
are in base 2.
Each of the sensors has its own set of C independent
messages. We denote each such message by Mn,c, n ∈ N , c ∈
{1, . . . , C}, and sensor n ∈ N message list by:
Mn = [Mn,1;Mn,2; . . . ;Mn,C ]
We further consider all the possible sets of K active sensors,
and denote by W ∈ {1, . . . , (NK)} the index of the subset
S ⊂ {1, . . . , N} of sensors active and transmitting at the
same time. Thus, Sw denotes the w-th subset of size K out
of the N sensors. The WSN solution we consider is fair in a
sense that if sensors have the same transmission probability,
they have the same probability to access the channel and the
protocol suggested dose not prefer sensors over others. We
further denote by
MW = [Mw1,c1 ;Mw2,c2 ; . . . ;MwK ,cK ]
the K messages transmitted by the active sensors (members
of Sw) to the sink. Note that each row in MW corresponds to
a separate message, that is, Mwi,ci is the cith message of the
with sensor in the active set.
As previously described, for each message a sensor has a
unique sequence, which in the sequel we refer to as codeword.
That codeword is the one transmitted whenever the sensor
intends to send this message. In other words, if sensor n is set
to send Mn,c, it uses the codeword XTn associated with this
message. Each message has a different codeword associated
with it (we drop the message index for clarity). Given the
particular messages sensors intend to transmit, we define a
transmission matrix
X = [XT1 ;XT2 ; . . . ;XTN ] ∈ {0, 1}N×T ,
6Figure 3: Encoding, transmission and detection in the sug-
gested protocol.
where each row corresponds to a codeword, describing the
message a sensor may transmit if it is active.
Assuming that sensors use Power Amplitude Modulation
(PAM), we denote by
x˜j(l) =
T∑
t=1
Xj(t)g(l − (t− 1)T0), 0 ≤ l ≤ T · T0,
the signal transmitted by the j-th sensor, where minislot t is
defined by (t− 1)T0 ≤ l ≤ tT0 and g(l), 0 ≤ l ≤ T0 denotes
the PAM pulse. The channel output signal y˜(l) is given by
y˜(l) =
∑
j∈K
hj x˜j(l) + wn(l),
where hj is a channel fade for the jth active sensor and wn is
an additive noise at the sink. Note that the fade herein is fixed
for the entire transmission only for simplicity of exposition,
and it may depend on t as well. Figure 3 depicts an example.
We denote by Pth the power threshold of the sink’s
hard decision mechanism. Hence, the outcome vector YT =
(Y (1), . . . , Y (T )) at the sink is binary, with 1 in a minislot t
if ∫ tT0
(t−1)T0
y˜(l)g(l − (t− 1)T0)dl ≥ Pth,
and 0 otherwise. In the first part of this work we assume that
the noise in the channel cannot produce errors at the sink. In
Section VIII, we will extend the model, and consider the case
in which noise can produce positive and negative errors.
We denote by Wˆ and MˆWˆ (Y
T ) the set of sensors estimated
by the sink to be the transmitting set, and the estimated
set of messages sent by them, respectively, according to the
received signal Y T . We refer to the possible transmission
matrix, together with the decoder as a WSN algorithm. The
following definition lays out the goals of the WSN algorithm.
Definition 1. A sequence of WSN algorithms with parameters
N,K,C and T is asymptotically reliable if at the sink,
observing Y T , we have
lim
N→∞
P (MˆWˆ (Y
T ) 6= MW ) = 0,
i.e., the error probability both in the active set and the message
associated with this set, goes to zero as the number of sensors
goes to infinity.
In Section XII, we show that our coding and decoding
procedures are successful at moderate and even small values
of N . In the next section, we construct a code (for parameters
N , K and C) which associates a codeword of length T to each
of the N ·C messages (C per sensor) and a decoding algorithm
MˆWˆ (Y
T ), such that observing Y T , the sink will identify the
subset of active sensors and the messages transmitted by them
with desired high probability.
VI. CODE CONSTRUCTION AND DECODING AT THE SINK
We now turn to the construction and decoding in detail.
A. Codebook Generation
For each sensor n ∈ N , we map each message c ∈
{1, . . . , C} to a codeword. We now provide the construction
of a codebook per sensor. Let P (x) ∼ Bernoulli(ln(2)/K).
Using a distribution P (XT ) =
∏T
i=1 P (xi), generate C
independent and identically distributed codewords xT (c), 1 ≤
c ≤ C. We denote this set of codewords as the n-th ”bin”.
Thus, a bin contains C codewords of size T . Bins across
sensors are independent as well. The codebook is depicted
in the central side of Figure 3. Reveal the codebooks to the
sensors and the sink.
B. Decoding at the Sink
The first decoder we suggest is the optimal decoder, Maxi-
mum Likelihood (ML). This decoder will declare the right set
of K messages transmitted (and the active sensors) with a high
probability if T satisfies the bound Lemma 1 below. However,
such a decoding algorithm is complex and assume that W
is uniformly distributed, that is, there is no a-priori bias to
any specific subset of active sensors. Hence, in Section VII,
we consider a computationally efficient algorithm without any
assumption required on W distribution.
As described in Section V, in the first decoding step, the sink
uses a hard decision mechanism to achieve the binary channel
output vector Y T . After Y T is obtained, the ML decoder looks
for a collection of K codewords Xˆ
T
Swˆ
, each one taken from a
separate bin, for which Y T is most likely. Namely,
P (Y T |XˆTSwˆ) > P (Y T |XTSw`),∀w` 6= wˆ.
That is, the sink looks for both the set wˆ, and the messages
cˆj , j ∈ Swˆ which explain Y T the best. Then, the sink declares
Wˆ as the set of active sensor and maps the rows in Xˆ
T
Swˆ
back
to the messages, as this is a 1 : 1 mapping.
C. Reliability
The following lemma is a key step in proving the reliability
of the decoding algorithm.
Lemma 1. If the size of the codewords satisfies
T ≥ max
1≤i≤K
(1 + ε)K
i
log
(
N −K
i
)
Ci, (1)
7then, under the codebook above, as N →∞ the average error
probability approaches zero.
Note that using the upper bound log
(
N−K
i
) ≤
i log (N−K)ei , the maximum in Lemma 1 is easily solved, and
we have
T ≥ (1 + ε)K log(N −K)Ce.
That is, assuming a WSN algorithm for the protocol described
in Section V, with the parameters N , K and C, if the size of
the codewords is
T = Θ (K logNC) , (2)
observing Y T at the sink, the decoder can identify the sensors
and the messages with high probability.
Corollary 1. Assume each sensor has B bits to send. That is,
B = logC. Then the length, in single-bit minislot, required to
send B bits from K sensors, out of N , without knowing in a
once which will transmit and without setting any pre-defined
schedule is Θ (K logN +KB), namely, besides the obvious
linear dependence in KB, there is only logarithmic added
factor in N .
The proof of Lemma 1 extends the results given in [26,
Theorem III.1] to the codebook required for WSN. Specif-
ically, we may interpret the analysis in [26, Section III] as
analogous to the case where each sensor has only one message
in its bin. However, in the WSN protocol suggested herein,
each sensor has C messages in its bin, and the decoder has(
N
K
)
CK possible subsets of codewords to choose from,
(
N
K
)
for the number of possible sensors and CK for the number
of possible rows (messages) to take in each bin. The analysis
is complex, taking into account the fact that rows have to be
selected from different bins, and is out of the scope of this
version. In the technical report completing this submission,
Appendix C , we formally analyze the bound on the error
probability, based on our earlier work [27, Lemma 2].
VII. EFFICIENT DECODING ALGORITHMS
In the decoding algorithm described in Section VI, as well
as the secured version given in Appendix A , the sink uses
an ML decoder to identify the sub-set of K active sensors
and the messages they transmitted. Such a decoding algorithm
may suffer from high computational complexity, especially
when the number of simultaneously transmitting sensors, K,
is high. In this section, we present a computationally efficient
algorithm. Specifically, we harness the Column Matching
(CoMa) procedure [3], which utilizes a much simpler decoding
rule at the price of only a slightly lower rate, i.e., slightly
higher codeword length T . The resulting decoding process
at the sink is very efficient, and can be implemented for
practically any N and K.
CoMa relies on the observation that a busy minislot (i.e., a
minislot for which the sink detected energy on the channel)
can only indicate that at least one of the sensors transmitted
in this minislot, yet, using a busy minislot one cannot validate
or invalidate any specific codeword. In other words, during
a busy minislot, regardless of whether a corresponding bit
in a codeword is 1 or 0, if the codeword was suspected
as a transmitted codeword it remains as such. On the other
hand, an idle minislot (i.e., a minislot in which no trans-
mission was detected by the sink) can invalidate codewords
in which the corresponding bit was 1, i.e., all codewords
for which the corresponding bit is 1 could not have been
transmitted (disregarding noise; The noisy case is discussed
in Section VIII). Accordingly, CoMa examines all minislots
for which no transmission was detected, and invalidates the
codewords that 1 appears in the corresponding bit.
Figure 4 depicts a small example of the efficient decoding
algorithm suggested compared to ML decoding. This example
includes 7 sensors (N = 7); each has only one possible
codeword to transmit (C = 1) and the expected number of
simultaneously transmitting sensors is 2 (K = 2). Figure 4
(a) presents the codewords matrix such that row i corresponds
to sensor i’s codeword. In the example the second and seventh
sensors are awake and transmit their codewords, while all
other sensors are asleep. Accordingly, the last row indicates
the channel output after energy detection, Y T . It is important
to note that since both the code construction as well as the
channel are memoryless across minislots, both the suggested
algorithm and ML can be easily viewed on a minislot-by-
minislot basis (per-column).
Examining the first column in Figure 4 (b), since the output
in the first minislot indicates that there was no transmission
in this minislot (Y (1) = 0), the sink can conclude by both
of the decoding methods that sensors 1 and 6 are not the
transmitters. In the second minislot (Figure 4 (c)), the output
indicates that there was a transmission (Y (2) = 1). The CoMa
decoder disregards this minislot. The ML decoder, however, is
stronger and may go over all pairs of codewords. It can thus
infer (based on this minislot alone) that the pair of sensors
which transmitted must include at least one of the sensors 2 or
4. In the same manner, since Y (3) = 1 in Figure 4 (d), CoMa
does not gain any new knowledge, yet the ML decoder now
infers that at least one of sensors 5 and 7 were transmitting as
well. In fact, the ML decoder has more knowledge. It can now
know that while 2 and 4 were possible transmitters before, now
they cannot be the transmitting pair (this is not depicted in the
figure). Since Y (4) indicates that there was no transmission
in the 4th minislot, both decoders can conclude that sensors
4, 5 and 6 are not possible transmitters. Accordingly, the ML
decoder can deduce that sensors 2 and 7 are the transmitting
sensors and finish the decoding process. However, the CoMa
decoder, which invalidated only 4 sensors (sensors 1, 4, 5,and
6) still has 3 legitimate candidates for transmission (Figure 4
(e)). Based on the 5th minislot, which indicates that there was
no transmission at that time, CoMa can invalidate sensor 3
and reach the same conclusion as ML.
Section XII presents numerical results which validate the
above intuition, and depict the actual message lengths required
by both algorithms.
VIII. EFFECTS OF A NOISY CHANNEL
One of the advantages of the suggested protocol is its
robustness to noise and interference. Specifically, in the pro-
tocol suggested, the sink node only relies on a simple energy
8Figure 4: An example of decoding at the sink using ML and
CoMa methods.
detection mechanism in which on each minislot it just needs
to detect whether there was a legitimate transmissions (one
or more), or not, i.e., similar to the traditional carrier sense
mechanism, whether the received signal is above the noise
floor or not.
While such a mechanism trades off rate for robustness
very well, errors may occur due to strong interference from
unregistered devices or due to sporadic high noise. There are
two possible errors: false positive detection, which is more
common, in which the sink detects energy despite the fact that
no legitimate sensor was emitting energy in the minislot, and
the less common one, false negative, in which the sink does not
detect energy despite the fact that at least one legitimate sensor
had emitted energy during the minislot. The latter type can
happen due to temporary channel changes (e.g., deep fades).
Note that at without explicit error correction, at least for the
first type (the more common), an error may result only in false
positive detection of a message, i.e., the sink will identify an
additional message that was not transmitted, yet there will be
no false negatives for which the sink will lose a legitimate
transmission (there can be an undecodable reception in which
a retransmission is required). Yet, in the sequel, we describe an
error correction coding scheme, at the price of only a slightly
higher codeword length T , depending on the noise level it
needs to overcome.
As for the optimal ML decoder suggested in Section VI, the
enhancement is straightforward. Since the decoder looks for a
set of codewords, for which the signal received at the sink is
the most likely set that has generated this outcome, regardless
of whether there is a perfect match between the combined
set and the outcome on all the minislots, all the decoder
needs to do is add sufficient redundant minislots to ensure
that the genuine set is discovered despite the few erroneous
minislots. The full analysis of the number of minislots required
to add using ML decoding follows from [26, Section VI],
with the consideration that each sensor has at most C possible
messages, similar to our analysis in Section VI and Appendix
C for the error-free case.
Overcoming the noisy channel using CoMa is a bit more
challenging. Recall that CoMa relies on the fact that a received
minislot with below the threshold energy, indicates that all
the possible sequences with 1 in this specific minislot can be
eliminated, as they were definitely not in the generating set.
However, with a noisy channel such a deduction cannot be
asserted, as each such minislot can be erroneous. Accordingly,
we adopt the Noisy-CoMa suggested for the non-secure GT
[3]. Specifically, we relax the firm CoMa requirement that
each and every 1 in a transmission sequence must overlap
with a high energy minislot in the additive outcome. Instead,
we allow for a certain number of “mismatches”, which is
determined based on both the number of ones in each transmis-
sion sequence and on the noise level we wish to be protected
from (specifically, on the probability q that the energy detector
will provide an erroneous decision, interpreting high energy
minislot as low energy, or vice versa).
Formally, for a codeword c of sensor n, we define by ζn,c
its support, i.e., the set of indices which correspond to 1 in the
sequence ({t : Xn,c(t) = 1}). We also define the matching set
βn,c as the intersection of ζn,c and the support of Y , that is,
where both Y (t) = 1 and Xn,c(t) = 1. The decoder the uses
a “relaxed” rule, in which it allows a codeword to have less
than a fraction q of minislots in which the codeword has 1 but
the received signal was detected as below the threshold signal
(|βn,c| ≥ |ζn,c|(1 − q(1 + )), for  > 0). All codewords
with a fraction of mismatches less than q are declared as
transmitted. This procedure overcomes the errors occurring
by the energy detection mechanism, at the price of a slightly
higher T compared to the original CoMa algorithm given in
Section VII.
IX. MULTI-HOP PATHS
Throughout this paper we mainly concentrate on a single
hop path setup in which each device (sensor) is a single hop
away from its respective sink, i.e., the message transmitted
by a sensor is directly received by its associated sink without
the need for any relay. However, the protocol presented herein
can be easily modified to support multi-hop paths in which a
message needs to traverse multiple hops (pass through multiple
relays) before reaching its designated sink. In this section we
suggest possible modifications which support such multi-hop
paths setup.
The enhancements suggested herein rely on hierarchical or
cluster-based routing which is widely studied in the context of
data forwarding in wireless sensor networks. In cluster-based
routing, all sensors are organized in groups termed clusters.
Each cluster includes a Cluster Head (CH) which collects the
messages from its own cluster members and forwards it to
its designated sink. The information (messages) can traverse
several relays before reaching the sink. These relays, that
forward the traffic toward the sinks, can be dedicated entities,
other CHs or other sensors. We distinguish between the tier in
which each CH collects the information from all its devices
and the tier that inter-connects the CHs to their designated
sinks; we denote the latter the backhaul tier. Several hierar-
chical routing protocols have been developed based on such
cluster-based-architecture, and it has been shown that such
9protocols not only address the multi-hop routing challenge,
but also enhance many other performance objectives such
as energy consumption, load balancing and the scalability
problem of large WSNs (e.g., [28], [29]). In the sequel we
present two approaches to extend the protocol suggested in
this paper to support multi-hop traffic. We assume that the
first phases in which clusters are formed, CHs are selected
and a routing protocol discovering the routes between each CH
and its designated sink are performed based on any preferable
protocol (e.g., [28], [29]).
We suggest two approaches to forward the messages along
the routing paths toward the set of sinks. In both approaches
each CH collects the messages from its designated sensors
based on the suggested protocol (Section IV). The difference
is in the forwarding tier (the backhaul tier). Specifically, in
the first approach the forwarding mechanism that forwards
the messages collected by each CH toward the sink is per-
formed via any traditional MAC protocol (e.g., [10], [11],
[29]). Recall that as discussed in Section VI the suggested
protocol can be interleaved within traditional wireless sensor
protocols. Accordingly, the data collection and the forwarding
procedures can utilize different protocols. Note that relying
on this approach, each relay does not need to decode the
messages or identify the senders and can simply forward the
received sequence (Y (t)) as the message payload. Accord-
ingly, the relays need not hold the code books or perform any
decoding procedure. Each sink will hold the code-books of its
designated devices and perform the decoding procedure for
each cluster separately, as described in Section VI. Further
note that the length of the sequences assigned to each device
per message (T ) which reflects on the number of transmission
mini-slots and eventually on the message length forwarded on
the backhaul tier, can vary between the clusters and should
be according to the number of devices in each cluster. Each
sink should maintain the codebook for each of its designated
clusters. Based on the received packet origin (the originating
CH) and the respective codebook it can decode the messages.
On the other hand, the forwarding protocol on the backhaul
tier is not only inheriting the overhead required by the selected
protocol (headers, trailers, control fields, contention mecha-
nism, etc.) but also is prone to the detriments characterizing
the selected protocol (e.g., collisions, channel access delays,
reliability).
In the second approach both the data collection protocol and
the forwarding procedure rely on the protocol suggested in this
paper. The challenge is that different relays forward different
numbers of messages from different sets of devices. Note that
even in the same forwarding subtree the closer one gets to
the sink the larger the number of messages that can traverse
the relay and the larger the number of messages comprising
the transmitted sequence. We suggest two different ways to
resolve this challenge, each with attendant pros and cons.
(i) Combine and Forward: According to this scheme each
relay needs to combine the received sequences to a single
one and transmit it forward. This approach utilizes a single
codebook for each subtree (each sink and all its descending
devices share a single codebook). Accordingly, the length of
the sequences assigned to each device per message (T ) is the
same for all messages destined to the same sink. The codebook
for each such subtree is designed exactly as described in
Section VI, where the length of the codewords is determined
according to the number of possible messages destined to each
sink (N,C and K are determined according to the number
of devices in the tree rooted at the sink, the number of
expected messages per device in the tree and the estimated
upper bound on the expected number of awakened devices
simultaneously, respectively). Note that different sinks can
have different codebooks with different codeword length and
that the codebooks need not be coordinated between the trees
rooted at different sinks. Note that as in the first approach, also
in this case the relays do not need to decode the messages or
identify the senders, instead whenever a relay needs to forward
reports (receives the RFR indicating a new transmission cycle
start) it just needs to combine all the received sequences
(conduct Boolean sum of the bit pattern received from all its
successors) and transmit the result sequence. Obviously, the
cost is that all the transmission periods by all relays along the
path to the sink are according to the total number of devices
in the respective subtree.
(ii) Encode-Decode-Combine and Forward: Based on this
scheme, each relay needs to encode the received sequence, re-
decode the received messages based on a different codebook,
combine the received sequences to a single one (conduct
Boolean sum of the new decoded sequences) and transmit it
forward. Accordingly, each relay will have its own codebook
which needs to be coordinated only with its direct descendants.
The length of the sequences (codewords) transmitted by the
relays descendants is according to the number of possible
messages from all its descendant devices (number of possible
messages in the subtree rooted at the relay). Note that the
transmission period grows the closer one gets to the sink,
reaching its maximum on the last hop which connects the
sink to its descendants (exactly the same as the length of the
sequences at the Combine and Forward scheme). However,
note that the cost is that each relay needs to decode the
messages received, map each one to its corresponding longer
sequence, locally combine them to the longer combined se-
quence (performing Boolean sum, emulating the transmission
of the sequences) and transmit the newly generated sequence
after receiving the RFR.
X. DATA DISSEMINATION
Heretofore, we described and analyzed an efficient data
collection protocol for WSN. In this section, we leverage the
suggested method to design a data dissemination protocol, i.e.,
from a single source node to all sensors. We show that the
advantages obtained for data collection also apply to the case
of data dissemination. Similar to the upstream protocol (data
collection between the sensors and the sink) the downstream
protocol does not require any synchronization, coordination or
management overhead.
The system model is basically the same as the one pre-
sented in Section II. We assume that the sink is required to
disseminate messages to the sensors. We assume that each
sensor can receive up to Ci messages, and that the sink is
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Figure 5: An illustration of downstream protocol operation.
transmitting to at most K sensors simultaneously. If the sink
needs to transmit to more than K sensors, it is required to
break the designated sensors to groups of at most K sensors
each. Note that similar to the upstream case, K is a design
decision. Enlarging K will enable the transmission to a larger
group simultaneously, yet will consume more overhead per
transmission. Similar to the upstream case, we assume that
the sensors are quite limited, and are only required to employ
a simple energy detection mechanism in which they just need
to recognize whether there is a transmission on the channel
or not (i.e., whether the received SNR is above a threshold or
not).
Next we describe the design of the downstream protocol.
After providing an overview of the protocol, we describe the
encoding procedure at the sink and the decoding procedure
at each sensor. Similar to the upstream case, and utilizing
the same coding techniques, the downstream case supports
unsecured as well as secured versions.
A. Downstream Protocol Design
In the downstream case, the Sink node is required to
periodically send a beacon. This beacon can take two forms,
if the Sink is not required to send any data to any of the
sensors, it sends a predefined Null beacon (denoted as NB).
However, whenever the sink is required to send a message
to one or more sensors (but no more than K), it transmits
a predefined Data Dissemination beacon (denoted as DDB),
which initiates a sequence of R minislots (similar to the T
minislot epoch presented in Section IV for the data collection
protocol). During this dissemination interval, the sink transmits
its encoded message to all the designated sensors in the
bunch, according to the encoding scheme presented below.
Note that similar to the upstream case neither the DDB nor
the transmitted sequence need to contain the identity of the
addressee sensors.
Each sensor is required to periodically wake up and wait for
the sink’s beacon. If the beacon is NB, it can go back to sleep.
If it is DDB, it stays awake for the R minislot transmission
epoch, and after its termination, relying on the observed
sequence, it tries to decode whether the collected message
conveyed any information to itself (the decoding procedure
is presented below). To make sure messages were received,
the protocol can rely on ACKs sent by the receiving sensors.
These ACKs can be sent simultaneously by all the intended
sensors according to the upstream protocol. The downstream
operation of the protocol is illustrated in Figure 5.
B. Sink encoding
Similar to the upstream case, each message is assigned
a unique sequence of ones and zeroes of length R. The
construction of the sequences is random, similar to the one
described in Section VI. Accordingly, for each Sensor j ∈ K,
there is a unique codeword xT (cj) for each of the ci possible
messages. Therefore, the WSN matrix for the predefined
downstream messages contains ciK codewords of length R.
Assuming the set of intended receivers is K, the sequence
transmitted by the sink is
x˜(l) =
T∑
t=1
∑
j∈K
Xj(t)
 g(l − (t− 1)T0), 0 ≤ l ≤ T · T0.
The channel output signal y˜j(l) at the j-th awake sensor is
given by
y˜j(l) = hj x˜(l) + wn(l).
Hence, the outcome vector Y (t) ∈ {1, . . . , T} at the awake
sensors is 1 in a minislot t if∫ tT0
(t−1)T0
y˜j(l)g(l − (t− 1)T0)dl ≥ Pth,
and 0 otherwise. Figure 3 depicts the encoding procedure,
where in the downstream case, the sink does not know which
of the sensors is awake, yet it transmits the encoded message
x˜(l) assuming that all the addressee sensors are awake.
C. Decoding at the Sensors
The optimal ML decoder described in Section VI can also
be utilized by the sensors for the downstream traffic. However,
in order to exploit this ML decoder, each sensor is required to
hold the whole code-book, which may require a significantly
large memory. Furthermore, the decoding computational com-
plexity can be quite high. These two resources are scarce in
WSN.
An alternative decoder is the CoMa decoder described
in Section VII. For this decoder, not only the decoding
algorithm is computationally efficient, but also each sensor
is only required to store a small code-book containing the
possible messages destined to itself (obviously, the sink is
still required to know all the messages to all sensors). In
turn, when receiving the sequence of R mini-slots, each sensor
independently tries to match the sequence of received R mini-
slots, to one of its own codewords as proposed by the CoMa
algorithm; if a codeword matches, the sensor can identify the
message associated with this codeword, and can reply with a
corresponding ACK. Otherwise, the sensor knows that there
was no message destined to itself in this batch.
It is interesting to note that for this downstream protocol, if
each sensor utilizes the CoMa decoder, and the sink share with
each sensor has only the bin of codewords that are relevant it,
one gets privacy, i.e., each sensor can decode only messages
destined to itself and cannot decode messages transmitted by
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the sink to any of the other K − 1 sensors. The analysis for
this case is quite similar to the one provided in Appendix A,
and the technical enhancements are beyond the scope of this
paper.
XI. ADVANCE TECHNIQUES FOR WIRELESS
TRANSMISSION
To illustrate the WSN protocol suggested herein for wireless
radio transition, we assumed that sensors (in the data collection
setup) or the sink (in the data dissemination setup), utilize a
simple PAM. However, it is important to note that the protocol
suggested can utilize different transmission techniques. In
this section we will explore the utilization of the Orthogonal
Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) [30]. Recall
that traditional OFDMA, allows simultaneous low-data-rate
transmission to and from multiple users, by allocating different
user different fractions of the bandwidth. We assume that
in total there are Fch such closely spaced orthogonal sub-
carriers which are used to carry the data, and denote each by
fch ∈ {1, . . . , Fch} .
In order to support the WSN protocol suggested in Sec-
tions II and VI, we devised a modified OFDMA technique,
in which there is no a-priori sub-carrier assignment to the
active sensors, as in traditional OFDMA, but instead each of
the K active sensors can transmit its codeword on all the sub-
carriers. Specifically, each active sensor maps its codeword
to the subcarriers. In particular, the sensor transmits on the
sub-carriers fch that correspond to indices which are 1’s in
the codeword it intends to transmit, and does not transmit on
the sub-carriers that correspond to indices which are 0. For
example, if the codeword the sensor intends to transmit is
001001 it will transmit in the third and sixth sub-carriers and
will not transmit in the others. After mapping the codeword
to the sub-carriers, the sensor follows the regular FDMA
encoding procedure [30]. A graphical illustration of the mod-
ified OFDMA using BPSK modulator at each active sensor
is given in Figure 6. Obviously, if the codeword is greater
than the number of sub-carriers (T > Fch) it needs to be
partitioned and transmitted in T/Fch minislots. Accordingly,
assuming a WSN algorithm given in Section VI, with the
parameters N , K and C, and using OFDMA and BPSK
techniques, with Fch frequency channels, returning to (2) the
number of mini-slots required to transmit the codewords is
T (Fch) = Θ
(
K logNC
Fch
)
. Obviously, the same procedure also
applies to the Data Dissemination protocol (Section X). Only
this time the sink maps each of the codewords it intends
to transmit into the sub-carriers and performs the OFDM
procedure over the collected mapping, in which if a sub-carrier
is mapped by two or more codewords, the sink refers to it just
as if it was mapped by a single sub-carrier.
It is important to note that the modified OFDMA suggested
herein also applies to the Secured-WSN version suggested in
Appendix A. Under this secured version we assume that due
to interference, collisions (low SINR) or low SNR, the eaves-
dropper is not accessible to all the frequency channels in each
mini-slot. Specifically, the eavesdropper is available to at most
FchT (Fch)δ symbols transmitted. Hence, assuming a SWSN
Figure 6: Transmission using a modified OFDMA technique
for the suggested protocols.
algorithm suggested in Appendix A, with the parameters N ,
K and C, for any 0 ≤ δ < 1, and using OFDMA and BPSK
techniques, with Fch frequency channels, according to (4) the
number of mini-slots required to transmit the codewords is
T (Fch) = Θ
(
K logNC
Fch(1−δ)
)
.
XII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide insight into the proposed protocol
and the analytical results presented in this paper, both for
the unsecured and secured versions, via simulations. It is
important to note that comparison with all-purpose WSN MAC
protocol is pointless, as the overhead required to support such
all-purpose protocols is one order of magnitude greater than
the one required in our designated protocol. For example,
utilizing RI-MAC [11], which is considered a highly efficient
protocol, for the data harvesting problem presented in this
paper, the sink node would need to broadcast a beacon, similar
to the RFR herein, followed by the report transmissions by
all pending sensors. Obviously, if more than one sensor is
waiting for transmission, which is highly probable in such a
dense network, a collision will occur and a tedious collision
resolution will follow; in case of several nodes transmitting
simultaneously, this can repeat several times, which is time
consuming. Besides the overhead and latency consumed due
to the channel access and collision resolution mechanism, the
message payload, which can range between several bytes per
message to much longer messages, is also airtime consuming
(e.g., in [11] the performance on short packets of 28Bytes
was examined). In addition, one needs to take into account
the overhead induced by data encapsulation which can include
multiple addresses and other control information (e.g., an
802.11 ACK message, which conveys only receiver ID and
a single bit of information is 14Bytes plus physical-layer
encapsulation). In contrast to all this overhead, as we will show
in our results, assuming a network of 500 nodes and allowing
up to 5 sensors transmitting simultaneously, each having up to
10 different messages it can transmit, will require only about
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Figure 7: ML and CoMa simulation results. (a) WSN protocol
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65 minislots, each of which can be the length of a single
modulated bit.
All simulations presented are conducted in MATLAB,
where we implemented the suggested protocols in full: code
construction, encoding, the multiple access wireless channel
(noise and propagation channel gain) and decoding procedure
at the sink, as well in the secure model decoding procedure
at the eavesdropper.
First, we examine the noiseless channel assuming that there
are no errors in the signal received. In Figures 7(a) and 7(b) we
examined the size of the required codeword (T ) to decode the
messages, for the unsecured and secured versions, respectively.
In particular, for N = 500, C = 10 and with K = 3, we
repeated the simulations trying to decode the messages for
different T and presenting the minimal T required both for
the ML and the CoMa decoders. It is important to note that
in the secure model we adapted the number of codewords
in each sub-bin as required in the code construction, to keep
the eavesdropper completely ignorant, namely, with success
probability approaching zero, i.e., for each T we constructed
a different code. Each plotted point in the figure depicts the
average of 4000 simulations.
Figure 7(a) depicts the performance of the WSN model
given in Sections VI and VII, using CoMa and ML decoding
algorithms. In particular, we present the Cumulative Distribu-
tion Function (CDF) of decoding the messages as a function of
the size of the codeword in the code (T ). For example, as can
be seen in the figure, in order to attain 95% success probability
the required codeword length is T = 35 and T = 105 for the
ML and the CoMa decoders, respectively, i.e., in 95% of the
simulation instances we succeeded to decode the messages for
these T ’s. In order to attain 100% of success, T should be 45
for ML and 130 for the CoMa decoder. It is important to note
that for this setup there are no false negatives, i.e., the sink
can mistakenly decode more messages than actually sent, but
will not miss a message. Accordingly, one can compromise the
success probability slightly in order to shorten the transmission
time.
In Figure 7 (b) we show the performance of SWSN model
given in Appendix A, using the same setup as in the previous
simulations, only this time in the presence of an eavesdropper
which is accessible on average to Tδ mini-slots from the sink
output channel, where δ = 0.1 (i.e., in the simulations we
have randomly decided whether the eavesdropper can sense
the energy generated on each minislot, such that each minislot
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Figure 8: Numerical results of the achievable schemes, for
different values of N and K. Left panel WSN, right panel
SWSN.
was heard by the eavesdropper with probability δ = 0.1,
independent from one minislot to the other). Again, it can
be seen that the simulation results agree with the analytical
results given in Appendix A. Specifically, the code length, T ,
(number of minislots) which guarantees 100% decodable rate
is T = 55 and T = 160 for the ML and the CoMa decoders,
respectively, falling behind the analytical upper bound.
Next, we provide numerical results to provide insight into
the tradeoffs between the different parameters, and specifically
the number of sensors, the number of active sensors and the
sequence length. Note that the following results only present
the analytical upper bound of Section VI, which as can be
seen, are typically pessimistic.
Figure 8, left panel, depicts the relation between the size of
the codewords T and the number of sensors N for different
Ks, in the unsecured version. Namely, for each line in the
figure, we keep K and C fixed, and vary N to show the
bound on the codeword length, T , according to (1). It can be
clearly seen that the rate in the network scales logarithmically
with N for all considered K, in contrast with TDMA, where
the number of slots required scales linearly with the number
of transmitting sensors. Accordingly, we can conclude that as
long as the number of simultaneously transmitting nodes and
the number of different messages each sensor stores are kept
fixed, the suggested protocol scales very well with the number
of sensors in the network, i.e., the protocol is efficient even
when there is a high number of sensors in the network.
Figure 8, right panel, according to (3), for the depicts the
same setup for the secured version (SWSN), for δ = 0.1,
i.e., the eavesdropper is accessible to 10% of the mini-slots.
Note that even though the rate required in order to keep the
eavesdropper ignorant is slightly higher with respect to the
unsecured version, the same logarithmic trend in N is kept.
Figures 9 depicts the results when we keep N and C fixed
and vary the number of simultaneously transmitting sensors,
K, for different Ns. The achievable rate in the network is lin-
ear in K, hence can be quite effective even for larger K. Recall
that K, the number of simultaneous transmissions, affects the
latency of the reports. E.g., as the number of simultaneous
attempts rises, a protocol with exponential random back-offs
will suffer significantly from both bad channel utilization and
as high latencies. In the suggested protocol, the degradation is
graceful.
Figures 10 depict the results when N and K are fixed and
the number of messages each sensor has (C) is varied, for
various Ks. The figure clearly depicts that the logarithmic
13
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SWSN.
trend in the achievable rate as a function of C, is kept
both for the unsecured and secured versions, meaning that
when the number of possible messages each sensor can send
increases, the suggested protocol is still efficient. However,
one needs to recall that the number of possible messages
grows exponentially with the message size, i.e., each bit in
the payload multiplies the message bank by two. Accordingly,
trying to adopt the procedure to the traditional messages is
definitely not scalable.
To conclude, the numerical results illustrate trends in the
rates of the protocol, which are consistent with the analytical
results presented in Section VI and Appendix A. We note that
the protocol is effective even when the number of sensors
in the network or the number of simultaneous transmitting
sensors is high, as long as the number of messages each
sensor can transmit is moderate. In Appendix B, we present
simulation results for the complete secure protocol. Moreover,
in Section XIII, we present an implemented wireless setup
with GNU Radio and RF hardware, in which we validate and
obtain the numerical results given in this section.
XIII. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present two implementations under a
complete setup of the suggested protocol and the efficient
decoding algorithm based on Sections IV-VII. In the first
implementation, we validate the suggested wireless proto-
col, utilizing GNU Radio open-source software development
toolkit ([31]) with external RF hardware. In the second imple-
mentation, we utilize low cost devices to further demonstrate
that the suggested protocol can operate efficiently in real time
on low cost devices with highly limited capabilities (power,
memory and computation limitations).
In order to demonstrate the suggested protocols operation
over the air, we have implemented both the sink and sensors
on the USRP Software Defined Radio Devices NI−USRP−
2901. In our implementation each sensor held a bank of 10
Figure 11: Representation of the received signal. (a) Upper
graph, the received signal in time domain. (b) Middle graph,
the normalized representation of the received signal after hard
decision mechanism. (c) Lower graph, the received signal in
frequency domain.
different messages (C = 10) and allowed 3 randomly selected
devices to transmit simultaneously (K = 3). The code was
designed for 50 devices and the transmission interval was
65 minislots (T = 65). The signals were transmitted over
RF frequency of 1.8GHz with 100Hz bandwidth, utilizing
PAM modulation. The sensors sampling rate is 160KHz,
whereas the signal received at the sink after Automatic Gain
Control (AGC) is of power below 100mW and sampled at a
rate of 320KHz. The sinks sample rate is 1600 samples per
mini-slot. We have implemented the CoMa decoding scheme
which despite the over the air transmissions experienced very
high accuracy both in detecting the transmitting devices and
the correct message transmitted, consistent with the analytical
results presented in Section VI. Figure 11 depicts the received
signal from the channel in the time domain, its corresponding
square signal after hard decision mechanism and the received
signal in frequency domain.
In the second implementation we demonstrate the opera-
tion of the protocol on low cost devices. We have imple-
mented a sink and seven sensors using STM32F303RE
and STM32F103C8T6 evaluation boards, respectively. The
sensors and the sink were connected to a joint (wired) bus
(Figure 12). Each sensor sporadically chose one out of 35
preloaded messages and waited for transmission. The sink
periodically transmitted an RFR signal (6 bits at 45Hz)
and the sensors with pending messages started transmission
following the sinks signal. The codewords were of length
T = 250, transmitted at 5Hz. Note that the slow transmission
rate was chosen solely to be able to visualize the transmitted
signal using the green LEDs. Once the (combined) signal was
received at the sink, it initiated a decoding procedure based
on the efficient decoding algorithm given in Section VII. This
implementation demonstrates that even very simple sensors,
14
Figure 12: Hardware implementation.
with a CPU speed of only 8MHz and 8KB of memory, were
able to carry out the protocol successfully.
XIV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we design a highly efficient WSN MAC
protocol, to collect information from a large number of
sensors. This WSN protocol is specified by a dense set of
wireless sensors in the network, out of which a unknown
subset may be active and transmit at the same time to a
sink. To support the suggested protocol, we provided a very
simple codebook construction with very simple and efficient
encoding and decoding procedures. Moreover, we extend the
WSN protocol suggested to a secure version, in which an
eavesdropper which has access to a noisy vector from the sink
output, will be kept completely ignorant regarding the subset
of sensors transmitting and their messages.
To validate the efficiency, of both the non-secure and
secure WSN models suggested, we provide rigorous analysis,
numerical results and simulations, which illustrate how the
different parameters of the network affect the performance of
the protocol, namely, the rate of the wireless channel.
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APPENDIX A
SECURE-WSN PROTOCOL
In a Secure-WSN protocol, in addition to the goals presented
in Section V for the non-secure model, we wish to keep an
eavesdropper, which may be able to observe a subset of the
transmissions, ignorant regarding the information transmitted
and the information of which subset of K sensors were active.
We assume eavesdropper can observe a noisy vector z˜(l),
generated from the output signal y˜(l). In this paper we
consider an erasure channel at the eavesdropper, with erasure
probability of 1 − δ, i.i.d. That is, on average, Tδ mini-slots
of the channel output are not erased and are available to the
eavesdropper. We assume the eavesdropper uses the same hard
decision mechanism, hence observes ZT ∈ {0, 1, ?}T . While
this is an un-necessary restriction on Eve, it simplifies the
technical aspects of this section and allows us to focus on the
key methods.
The reliability constrain given in Definition 1 and the
following secrecy constrain lay out the goals of the algorithm.
Definition 2. A sequence of algorithms with parameters
N,K,C and T is asymptotically secure if, at the eavesdropper,
observing ZT , we have
lim
T→∞
1
T
I(MW ;ZT ) = 0.
That is, Eve cannot decode anything from the set of messages.
Thus, observing Y T , in the data collection setup the sink
will identify the subset of active sensors and the messages
transmitted by them, in the data dissemination setup, each
sensor will identify his corresponded messages transmitted
by the sink, yet, observing ZT in either of the setups, the
eavesdropper will not be able to identify the subset of active
sensors and the messages transmitted.
The transmission and detection processes are similar to the
ones described in Section V and Section X for the non-secure
protocols, yet, in order to support a secured version of the
protocol, we modify the code and the decoding algorithm.
For simplicity, we only describe the secure data collection
setup. However, extending the transmission and detection pro-
cesses described in Section X to the secure data dissemination
setup is straightforward, since, the code and the decoding al-
gorithm are the same as in the secure data collection algorithm
we now describe.
A. Sensors Encoding Process
In order to keep the eavesdropper ignorant, we propose an-
other level of binning. Specifically, for each sensor n ∈ N , we
create a sub-bin for each message. We then randomly map each
message that the sensor wants to transmit, c ∈ {1, . . . , C}, to
a codeword in the corresponding sub-bin, that is, the {n, c}-th
sub-bin, which contains F codewords of size T . Figure 13
depicts an example.
More precisely, we assume a source of randomness (R, pR),
with known alphabet R and known statistics pR is available
to the encoder. It is important to note that this source of
randomness does not have to be shared with any other party. A
stochastic encoder [32], at each active sensor j ∈ K, selects
uniformly at random one codeword xT (cj , f) , 1 ≤ c ≤ C
and 1 ≤ f ≤ F from his sub-bin, that is, it maps a selected
message and the source of randomness to a transmission code-
word XTn . This mapping, using the randomness, is intended to
confuse the eavesdropper regarding the sensor transmitting and
the message sent. Hence, over the MAC channel, we still have
a transmission matrix XTSw , each of its rows corresponding
to a different active sensor in the index set Sw, and that
transmission matrix contains K codewords of size T , yet now
there is no 1 : 1 mapping between messages and codewords,
and each message corresponds to F codewords.
B. Codebook Generation
For each sensor we generate a bin, containing several sub-
bins. The number of such sub-bins corresponds to the number
C of messages that each sensor has. The number F of
codewords in each sub-bin corresponds to Tδ, the number
of un-erased mini-slots that the eavesdropper may obtain, yet
normalized by the number of active sensors. The codebook is
depicted in the central side of Figure 13.
Thus, for each sensor we generate a bin of C · F random
codewords (the codewords are generated similar to the non-
secure model). Then, we split each bin to sub-bins of F
codewords xT (c, f), 1 ≤ c ≤ C and 1 ≤ f ≤ F . Hence,
for each message, c ∈ {1, . . . , C}, there are F possible
codewords correspond in the {n, c}-th sub-bin. During the
encoding process, only one codeword from the {n, c}-th sub-
bin will be randomly selected for transmission. We assume
Eve may have this codebook as well.
C. Decoding at the Sink
The decoder in the SWSN algorithm is similar to the one
proposed in Section VI-B for the non-secure WSN. Hence,
after Y T is obtained, the ML decoder looks for a collection
of K codewords Xˆ
T
Swˆ
, each one taken from a separate sub-bin
under different bins, for which Y T is most likely. Namely,
P (Y T |XˆTSwˆ) > P (Y T |XTSw`),∀w` 6= wˆ.
However, due the randomness in the encoding procedure of the
SWSN algorithm, there is no 1 : 1 mapping between messages
transmitted and codewords, and each message corresponds to
a few codewords. Hence, the sink looks for both the set wˆ,
and the codewords Xˆ
T
j ,∀j ∈ Swˆ, which are most likely. Then,
the sink declares Wˆ (Y T ) as the set of active sensor, where wˆ
is the set of bins in which the codewords reside and maps the
selected codewords Xˆ
T
Swˆ
back to the messages cˆj according to
the corresponding sub-bins.
D. Reliability
The reliability proof using SWSN protocol is almost a direct
consequence of the proof given in Section VI for the non-
secure WSN. However, there is a main difference: the decoder
2Figure 13: Encoding, transmission and detection in the SWSN
protocol.
has
(
N
K
)
CKFK possible subsets of codewords to choose from,(
N
K
)
for the number of possible sensors, CK for the number
of possible messages in each bin and FK for the number of
possible codewords to take in each sub-bin. Thus, when fixing
the error event, there are
(
N−K
i
)
CKFK subsets to confuse the
decoder. Specifically, to obtain the bound on the size of the
codewords given in Lemma 2, the error probability analysis
in the ML decoder extends the bound given in Lemma 3, by
considering C · F codewords per sensor, and by considering
multiple error events, as given in [27], for the analysis of
the secure GT error probability bound. E.g., events where the
decoder chooses the wrong codeword for some sub-bin, yet
identified the sensors and the messages transmitted correctly
(since the sub-bins were correctly identified), and events where
the codeword selected was from a wrong sensor sub-bin (hence
resulted in an error).
Lemma 2. If the size of the codewords satisfies
T ≥ max
1≤i≤K
1
1− (1 + ε)δ
1 + ε
i/K
log
(
N −K
i
)
Ci, (3)
then, under the codebook above, as N →∞ the average error
probability approaches zero.
The analysis of the information leakage at the eavesdropper,
to prove the security constraint is met, is a direct consequence
of the proof given in [33, Section V.B], where we protect not
only on the information of which of the sensors was transmit-
ting a message but also protect the messages as well. Hence,
in the same way as given in [33], yet, instead of showing that
I(W ;ZT )/T → 0, we can show that I(MW ;ZT )/T → 0.
To conclude, assuming a SWSN algorithm with the param-
eters N , K and C, for any 0 ≤ δ < 1, if size of the codewords
T = Θ
(
K logNC
1−δ
)
, (4)
for some ε ≥ 0, then there exists a sequence of SWSN
algorithms which are reliable and secure (under the conditions
given in Definition 1 and Definition 2). Again, using the upper
bound log
(
N−K
i
) ≤ i log (N−K)ei , now on Lemma 2, the
maximum over i is easily solved, and we have
T ≥ 1 + ε
1− δK log(N −K)Ce.
APPENDIX B
SIMULATION RESULTS - SECURE PROTOCOL
To illustrate the all procedure we validate the secure proto-
col under a complete setup and a noisy channel. We examine
N = 500 sensors transmitting to a single sink node; we
assume that each sensor holds a bank of 10 different messages.
All wireless channel properties and parameters such as power,
distances and noise floors which we used throughout this
simulation are typical to such networks according to [34].
Sensors used PAM modulation and we have simulated the
whole procedure, including the random code generation, the
random wakeup procedure, the transmission, the threshold
based filtering and the decoding procedure both by the sink
and an eavesdropper.
Figure 14 depicts a random RFR sent by the sink which is
followed by a transmission from 2 sensors (Sensors 177 and
238 in this particular instance). Figure 14 (a) and (c) depict
the two codewords sent by the two sensors (b) and (d) depict
the associated PAM modulated signal, respectively. The two
sensors were 5m and 3m from the sink, and obtained power
signal at the sink of 17.5dBm and 21.1dBm, respectively
(transmission power was −55dBm). Figure 14(f) presents the
signal y˜(l) at the sink, which is the channel output resulting
from both codewords transmitted simultaneously plus the noise
(which was additive white Gaussian noise in −90dBm). Note
that since there is no need for any gain control and all
the more so for automatic gain control (AGC), the received
signal strength may vary beyond the receiver saturation point,
leading to signal clipping. Figure 14(f) also illustrates the
threshold based mechanism, which determines on which of
the minislots there was a transmission. The outcome of this
hard decision process, which is the input to the decoder (ML
or CoMa) is presented in 14(e). In this example, the number
of minislots utilized is above the upper bound requirement
given in Section VI, thus, the sink can successfully decode
both transmitted codewords.
Figure 14(h), presents the signal z˜(l) received by the
eavesdropper, which is accessible on average to 0.25% of the
minislots. The outcome of the hard decision process, which is
the input to the decoder (ML or CoMa) at the eavesdropper
is presented in Figure 14(g). In the secure model presented
in this example, we adapted the number of codewords in each
sub-bin as required in the code construction given in Appendix
A, to keep the eavesdropper completely ignorant.
APPENDIX C
ERROR PROBABILITY BOUND
In this section, we show a sketch of the bound on the error
probability of the maximum likelihood decoder based on the
proof given in [26], [33]. Thus, under the assumption that
all sensors and the messages are equality likely to be active
3Data Aggregation Over Boolean Wireless Networks with 500 sensors, each sensor has 5 messages.  2 sensors transmit: 80  21.  The distance for each sensors to the sink is: 3  6 [m], respectively. SNR: 21.1885      16.3277 [dBm], respectively.
Bounds ---  ML upper bound: 44, ML lower bound: 22, DND  bound: 121
Sink decoding status ---  DND decoder: Succeeded, ML decoder: Succeeded,     Eve decoding status ---  ML decoder: Disable
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(b) Modulated Codeword to transmit at active sensor: 177
(c) Codeword to transmit at active sensor: 238 in 3m
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(d) Modulated Codeword to transmit at active sensor: 238
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(f) Signal recieved at the Sink
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(h) Signal recieved at the eavesdropper
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Figure 14: WSN Simulation in typi al wireless environment.
and transmitted, respectively, we consider the error probability
given that the first K sensors are active, that is, W = S1 is
the active set. Denote this probability by Pe|1. We have
Pe|1 ≤
K∑
i=1
P (Ei),
where Ei is the event of a decoding error in which the decoder
declares a wrong message set from the sensors active which
differ from the true one in exactly i transmitted messages from
the active sensors (S1).
In the code construction suggested in Section VI, for each
sensor, there are C possible codewords. Only one of these
codewords is selected by the sensor to be transmitted at each
time slot. Since the decoder does not know which codewords
were selected in each bin to be transmitted, there are multiple
error events we should consider. E.g., events where the decoder
chooses the wrong codeword for some sensor, yet identified
parts of the sensors correctly, and, events where the codeword
selected was from a wrong sensor bin.
In this paper, we consider the error event Ei as the event
where a codeword decoded by the sink is not from the set of
the codewords transmitted from the active sensors set. Hence,
to avoid error event, in our analysis the decoder, not only got
correct codeword in each such bin right, but also the true active
sensor is detected by the sink.
Assuming the above definition of the error event, the bound
P (Ei) is almost a direct consequence of the proof given
in [33], where in the suggested coding sachem herein, each
sensor n ∈ N has C codewords in his bin. Particularly, we will
establish the following lemma given the proof in [33, Lemma
3].
Lemma 3. The error probability P (Ei) is bounded by
P (Ei) ≤ 2
−T
(
Eo(ρ)−ρ
log (N−Ki )Ci
T −
log (Ki )
T
)
,
where the error exponent Eo(ρ) is given by
Eo(ρ) = − log
∑
Y ∈{0,1}
∑
XS2∈{0,1}
[ ∑
XS1∈{0,1}
P (XS1)
p(Y,XS2 |XS1)
1
1+ρ
]1+ρ
, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
